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A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays
for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements ∗
Darrell Duffie and David Skeel

November, 2011; revised, January, 2012
Introduction

For nearly two years, the two of us have had a running discussion of the costs
and benefits of automatic stays for qualified financial contracts (QFCs), particularly
those held by systemically important major dealer banks. 1 Prominent among these
QFCs are over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and repurchase agreements (repos).
Several large U.S. financial institutions now have aggregate notional positions in
OTC derivatives exceeding $50 trillion. 2 Every business day, the broker-dealer
affiliates of these same large banks roll over $100 billion or more of new repo
financing of their securities inventories. As we will explain, in the event that such a
large financial institution files for bankruptcy without automatic stays on these
massive positions in derivatives and repos, its QFC counterparties would derive
what amounts to significant additional priority over other creditors. The advantages
and disadvantages of this priority, which we will summarize, have been a matter of
significant debate for the past decade, particularly since the 2008 crisis.

We agree with each other on the nature of the advantages and disadvantages
of stays on QFCs, but in some cases have weighed them differently in reaching policy
judgments, such as what sorts of financial institutions and QFCs should be exempted
from these stays. We hope that this report on our dialogue may shed some useful
light on these tradeoffs.
After some background on QFCs and automatic stays, we provide our joint
analysis of the costs and benefits of stays on the QFCs, with a focus on systemically
important financial institutions, including the special case of central market utilities.
∗

Duffie is at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. Skeel is at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School. We are grateful for helpful exchanges with Marnoch Aston, Andrew
Crockett, Doug Diamond, Richard Herring, Tom Jackson, Bill Kroener, David Mengle, Martin Oehmke,
Ken Scott, Penfield Starke, Kimberly Summe, John Taylor, Paul Tucker, and Bruce Tuckman. The
views expressed here, however, are entirely our own, and need not be held by any of these
commenters. Duffie has potential conflicts of interest that may be reviewed at his web page
( www.stanford.edu/~duffie/). Among these, he has been retained as a consultant by the estate of
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. on matters potentially related to the subject of this paper.
1 QFC is the term used for these contracts in banking regulation. The treatment in bankruptcy is
similar in many respects, but the bankruptcy law does not have an umbrella term corresponding to
QFC. It uses separate terms for different categories of QFCs, such as swap, repurchase agreement,
securities contract, and forward contract.
2 The latest available data can be found in quarterly reports of the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency.
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Following this, we state our respective policy conclusions. Briefly speaking, we both
believe that repos (and certain closely related QFCs) that are backed by liquid
securities should be exempt from automatic stays, or receive an effectively similar
treatment. Repos backed by illiquid assets, on the other hand, should not be given
this safe harbor. We both believe that derivatives that have not been centrally
cleared should be subject to automatic stays. One of us believes that stays should
also apply to cleared derivatives. The other author favors an exemption of cleared
derivatives from stays, except in the case of a failure of a regulated central clearing
party.
Background
When a firm files for bankruptcy in the United States, a stay immediately and
automatically goes into effect. 3 The stay prohibits a creditor from seizing or selling
collateral, from starting or continuing litigation against the debtor, or taking other
action to collect what the creditor is owed. In general, the stay has the purpose of
giving the debtor breathing space and halting the destructive “grab race” that might
otherwise ensue as creditors seek to collect what they are owed before the debtor’s
assets are exhausted. Creditors can negotiate with the debtor and other creditors
and can otherwise participate in the bankruptcy case. But they cannot terminate
contracts or engage in ordinary collection activities without first obtaining the
approval of the bankruptcy court. As a result of a series of legislative amendments
in the three decades since the current framework was enacted in 1978, U.S.
bankruptcy law now exempts qualified financial contracts (QFCs) from the
automatic stay and several other core bankruptcy provisions (one of which, the
preference provision, also will figure in our discussion below). The exempted
contracts include: swaps, which are broadly defined to include OTC derivatives and
a wide variety of other contracts, as well as “any agreement or transaction that is
similar” to any of the listed contracts; repurchase agreements; securities contracts;
forward contracts; and commodity contracts. 4

Derivatives are financial contracts whose payments are typically linked to
the prices of other financial instruments. They are used mainly for speculation and
hedging. Derivatives that are traded over the counter have an elaborate contractual
regime of counterparty credit risk management that is based on collateralization of
counterparty exposures and on the close-out netting of gains and losses on contracts
with the same counterparty. An early-termination close-out is triggered by events
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
The definitions can be found in 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B)(swap agreement); 11 U.S.C. §
101(47)(repurchase agreements); 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(forward contract); 11 U.S.C. §
741(7)(securities contract); 11 U.S.C. § 761 (commodity contract). “Financial participant,” another
key term, is defined in § 101(22A).
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such as failure to pay, a change of control, and, because of the exemption from the
stay and related provisions, bankruptcy. 5

A repurchase agreement, commonly known as a “repo,” is a contractual
arrangement under which a firm sells securities and simultaneously commits to
repurchase them at a pre-arranged price on a given future date. Repos are used,
among other purposes, to finance the purchase of securities. For this application, the
cash received in the opening-leg sale of securities can be viewed as the cash
proceeds of a loan; the repurchase price can be viewed as the loan payback amount.
The securities act as collateral to the effective loan. The repo counterparty, who is
the effective cash lender, holds the title to the securities during the term of the repo
and can therefore protect itself from the failure of the effective borrower through its
rights to the securities in lieu of receiving the cash back on the repo. Repos are also
the most common vehicle for taking short positions in fixed-income securities. To
create such a short, the counterparty immediately sells the securities that it receives
at the opening leg of the repo. In order to meet its obligation to return the securities
at the termination date of the repo, the counterparty buys them at that time in the
spot market. The counterparty thus profits from any decline in the market value of
the securities during the term of the repo. Shorts are used for both hedging and
speculative motives.
As we have mentioned, the most important examples of QFCs for large
dealer banks are OTC derivatives and repos. Securities lending agreements are
essentially the same as repos in most economic and legal respects, and are
commonly used to create short positions in equities. 6 Our remarks concerning repos
can generally be applied to securities lending agreements, another prominent form
of QFC.

The special treatment for QFCs, often called a “safe harbor,” has been
justified on a variety of grounds. 7 If derivatives and repos were subject to the
automatic stay, safe-harbor proponents have argued, then a debtor’s failure could
have a “domino effect,” taking other market participants down with it. For example,
a counterparty that had entered into a large derivatives contract with the debtor to
hedge its business risks might find itself suddenly and unexpectedly unhedged. With

Derivatives and other QFCs also are exempt from bankruptcy’s anti-ipso facto provisions. An ipso
facto clause is a provision that defines the debtor’s bankruptcy or insolvency as an event of default
and thus grounds for terminating the contact. Derivatives counterparties can thus terminate their
contracts when the debtor files for bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 559 (exempting repos from
bankruptcy’s invalidation of ipso facto clauses), § 560 (exempting swaps), § 561 (exempting netting
agreements), whereas ordinary contract creditors cannot. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c); § 365(e).
6 For an extended analysis of the similarities between repos and securities lending, see Andre Ruchin,
Can Securities Lending Transactions Substitute for Repurchase Agreement Transactions, 128 BANKING
L.J. 450 (2011).
7 The arguments summarized in this paragraph are described in greater detail in David Skeel &
Thomas Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012).
5
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a stay, it could not cancel its contract. It might not be able enter into a new hedging
contract on similar terms with another firm, and if it did enter such a replacement
position, it would run the risk of having too large a total derivatives position if its
original contract was unexpectedly assumed by the debtor’s estate. The
counterparty might also be harmed by the delay in obtaining access to its collateral,
or if the market moved against it while the debtor was in bankruptcy. Any delay in
the counterparty’s ability to terminate its derivatives with the debtor could
therefore destabilize the counterparty, and might even undermine market
confidence more generally. 8 Safe-harbor advocates have also warned about the ill
effects of “cherry picking.” 9 With a stay, a debtor could assume the contracts that
are “in the money,” while rejecting its bad contracts and relegating the
counterparty’s claim for damages to general unsecured status. The debtor’s
bankruptcy could therefore cripple certain counterparties, perhaps destabilizing the
entire underlying market.
While QFCs are generally exempted from the automatic stay in bankruptcy,
this exemption does not apply to the failure resolution process for regulated banks
administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Once the
Department of the Treasury initiates such a resolution, and the FDIC takes over as
receiver, an automatic stay on QFCs is in place for up to 24 hours. During this oneday period, the FDIC has the right to, among other actions, transfer QFCs to a bridge
financial institution or reject them. A rejected QFC that is not secured by collateral
would be treated as a general unsecured claim, and relegated to the payout given to
unsecured claims. If the rejected QFC were collateralized, on the other hand, the
counterparty could immediately sell the collateral, reducing the amount it was
owed; any deficiency would then be treated as a general unsecured claim.
Historically, rather than rejecting QFCs selectively, the FDIC has usually assigned
QFCs en masse to a bridge financial institution.

Title II of The Dodd-Frank Act introduced new resolution rules for
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Although SIFIs are not
precluded from filing for bankruptcy, regulators can put a SIFI into the new
resolution framework if, among other conditions, it is in default or in danger of
default and its failure could create systemic problems. 10 The new Title-II rules
institute what amounts to a brief stay on QFCs that is in essence the same as the
one-day FDIC stay applied to regulated banks. During the stay period of such a
resolution, counterparties are not permitted to invoke the ipso facto clauses in their
contracts. 11 In particular, they cannot terminate contracts until 5 p.m. of the day

These arguments correspond to what is sometimes described as counterparty contagion and a
confidence crisis.
9
See, e.g., John C. Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users, 112 BANKING L.J. 638, 640
(1995), emphasizing “cherry-picking” concern.
10 The resolution requirements are set forth in Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b).
11 As noted earlier, an ipso facto clause is a provision that defines the debtor’s bankruptcy or
insolvency as an event of default and thus grounds for terminating the contact. Ipso facto clauses are
standard provisions in OTC derivatives and repos.
8
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after the receivership is commenced. By that time, however, the contracts may have
been rejected by the FDIC, or may have been transferred to a bridge financial
institution or another acquirer of some portion of the debtor’s business, without a
right by the counterparty to terminate.

It is too early to tell which specific institutions will be subject to Title-II
resolutions. Major non-bank users of financial QFCs include central clearing parties
for OTC derivatives, large hedge funds, large insurance firms, and large asset
managers. Some of these could be designated as systemically important under the
Dodd-Frank Act, which would make them candidates for Title-II resolution in the
event they fall into financial distress. 12 The Title-II resolution process is to be
administered by the FDIC in essentially the same manner as the resolution process
for regulated banks.

Thus, U.S. law now applies what amounts to a one-plus day automatic stay on
QFCs held by banks, large bank holding companies, and designated systemically
important non-bank financial firms. Central clearing parties for derivatives are,
however, exempted from some aspects of the stay, whether or not they are
designated as systemically important, under a special provision of the Dodd-Frank
Act. We will come back to this limited exemption. As for insurance firms, indefinite
stays can be applied during insolvency processes in some venues, such as the state
of New York. 13 In the European Union, a series of “settlement-finality” EU Directives
offers exemption from normal bankruptcy hold-ups for QFC-like transactions. 14
There has not yet been a “live-ammo” test of the application of stays on QFCs
on the scale of the largest dealer banks or other major holders of OTC derivatives
and repos. This absence of experience covers the history of FDIC bank resolutions,
the Title-II process of Dodd-Frank, as well as resolution procedures used outside of
12

Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes regulators to designate non-bank financial institutions a
systemically important, and automatically puts banks with $50 billion or more in assets in this
category. These institutions are subject to a variety of regulations, including higher capital
requirements, that do not apply to other institutions. The Dodd-Frank Act does not make this status
a prerequisite for Title II resolution, but it does require regulators to conclude that a financial
institution’s default could have systemic consequences as a prerequisite to putting the institution
into resolution. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b)(2).
13
For the case of insurance firms domiciled in New York State, see the discussion of Section 7419 of
the New York Laws in “How Safe is the Harbor? Navigating Restructurings Involving Insurance
Company and Other Specialized Counterparties, CDSs, Mortgage Repos, Biofuels Contracts and
Obscure Derivatives,” ABA Business Bankruptcy Committee, Chapter 11 Subcommittee, September
25, 2008, Scottsdale, Arizona.
14 In “Systemic Liquidity Risk and Bankruptcy Exceptions," Centre for Economic Policy Research,
Policy Insight Number 52, October, 2010, Enrico Perotti lists the relevant EU Directives. He writes
that “The complete list is as follows: (EU Financial Collateral Directive of 6 June 2002 (OJ L 168/43),
the EU Settlement Finality Directive in 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities
settlement systems (OJ L 166/45), Directive 2009/44/EC of 6 May 2009 amending Directive
98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems, and Directive
2002/47/ EC on financial collateral arrangements as regards linked systems and credit claims."
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the U.S. Thus, some of our discussion of the failure consequences of stays is
necessarily speculative. We have some experience with bankruptcy safe harbors,
that is, with the absence of a stay, most dramatically in the Lehman Brothers case,
but even here significant questions remain.

We will explain how the behavior of systemically important financial
institutions and their counterparties, both before and during failure, depends
markedly on the presence or absence of an automatic stay. As a result, the existence
of a stay has a direct and large impact on participants in these contracts, and may
also have a major impact on financial market stability and thus the wider economy.
Key Costs and Benefits
One of the reasons the two of us have spent so much time discussing safe
harbors for QFCs over the past two years is that this exemption from the stay has
costs and benefits that are both extremely significant. Potential losses that are
purely transfers from one market participant to another are not on their own
significant to policy analysis, but are important whenever there are net social costs,
for example through systemic risk or deadweight frictional distress costs to the
debtor or its counterparties. The social costs and benefits of these stays have been
studied for some time. 15

QFC safe harbors could potentially raise social costs through five major
channels: (1) lowering the incentives of counterparties to monitor the firm; (2)
increasing the ability of, or incentive for, the firm to become too big to fail, with the
attendant moral hazard of relying on bailouts; (3) inefficient substitution away from
more traditional forms of financing; (4) increasing the market impact of collateral
fire sales; and (5) lowering the incentives of a distressed firm to file for bankruptcy
in a timely manner. We now discuss these channels, and later turn to the similarly
extensive potential benefits of the safe harbor.
The first and second channels are closely linked. As argued by Roe (2010)
and others, the safe-harbor exemption from stays reduces a QFC counterparty’s
incentive to monitor the debtor. Technically, the exemption does not give a
derivatives or repo counterparty higher priority than other creditors, but by freeing
a counterparty from the strictures of the stay that apply to most creditors, it has a
similar effect. This protection diminishes the counterparty’s incentive to carefully
screen the debtor before entering into a QFC, in order to avoid exposure to weak

15

For recent analyses, see Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis
Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011); Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and
Systematic Risk: Netting, Collateral and Closeout, 2 J. FIN. STAB. 55-70 (2006); Patrick Bolton & Martin
Oehmke Should Derivatives be Senior?, Columbia University working paper, May 11, 2011; and
Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special
Treatment?, 22 YALE J. REG. 91-122 (2005).
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debtors. The safe harbor also lowers the benefit of monitoring the debtor’s financial
condition during the term of the contract. Monitoring is beneficial to the extent that
it disciplines the debtor from taking risks that are excessive or otherwise inefficient.
Lowering the risk of the debtor’s failure is a social benefit because of the deadweight
costs of failure, such as legal expenses, lost franchise value, and potential knock-on
costs to the financial system.

Even with a safe harbor, the incentive to monitor does not disappear, because
a counterparty cannot be certain that it will be made whole in bankruptcy if it is not
fully collateralized. This was made clear in the case of Lehman’s bankruptcy, which
in some instances caused losses to derivatives counterparties above and beyond
those associated with the normal performance of their derivatives positions with
Lehman. 16 As explained by Summe (2011), Lehman’s large-bank counterparties
have recently settled about $22 billion in claims against Lehman for their losses on
OTC derivatives, receiving between 27.9 cents and 39 cents per dollar of claim. From
the reporting period following the failure of Lehman in 2008 until June 2011, U.S.
bank holding companies have experienced approximately $12 billion in additional
losses due to derivatives counterparty default, according to statistics compiled by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 17 This belies the notion that
QFC counterparties can walk away at default, paid in full, leaving only non-QFC
creditors to bear the costs of bankruptcy. A significant quantity of OTC derivatives
claims against Lehman remain unsettled to this day, over three years after the
bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the incentive for derivatives counterparties to monitor is
certainly reduced significantly by the safe harbor. A similar dilution in monitoring
incentives applies to repos.
The argument that safe-harbor prioritization lowers the monitoring
incentives of one class of claimants relative to another mirrors familiar
considerations that apply to ordinary senior and junior unsecured creditors.
Creditor prioritization involves a well-studied efficiency tradeoff, with the higher
priority creditor potentially decreasing and the lower priority creditor increasing its
monitoring. Indeed, banks have sometimes been encouraged by regulation to issue
subordinated bonds in order to improve monitoring. The argument was that the
associated dilution of the monitoring incentives of senior creditors would be more
than offset by the increased monitoring effectiveness of subordinated creditors.
They would become the “canary in the coal mine.” Likewise, the fact that the safe
harbor lowers the seniority of ordinary creditors relative to QFC claimants should
improve the effectiveness of monitoring by senior unsecured creditors, at least for a

16

Kimberly Summe, “An Examination of Lehman Brothers’ Derivatives Portfolio Post-Bankruptcy
and Whether Dodd-Frank Would Have Made Any Difference,” April 2011.
17
See “OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities, Second Quarter 2011,” at
page 18.
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firm that is not too big to fail. 18 (We consider the too-big-to-fail effect shortly.) Thus,
the fact that the safe harbor has monitoring implications does not on its own imply a
net loss of monitoring efficiency. In any case, if the loss of monitoring efficiency
associated with the safe harbor involves a sufficiently large expected cost to a given
firm, that firm could simply choose not to use derivatives. It could commit to avoid
them by its charter or through debt covenants.

This tradeoff argument does not apply, however, to the extent that the firm fails
to internalize the costs of its failure to others. For example, if there is reason to
believe that the debtor will be “bailed out” by the government before it collapses,
the monitoring incentive of senior unsecured creditors is reduced. The likelihood of
a bailout, moreover, grows with the size of the debtor’s derivatives and repo books,
because of the systemic risk associated with large positions in these QFCs. A safe
harbor from the automatic stay therefore allows, or even encourages, a dealer bank
to operate bigger derivatives and securities businesses. Thus, the safe harbor
contributes to the “too-big-to-fail” moral hazard. This, the incentive to become toobig-to-fail, is a second cost of the safe harbors from the automatic stay.

The third cost stems from the fact that the safe harbor may make repos and
derivatives a cheaper source of financing than alternatives such as traditional
secured loans. As evidence of this, a major expansion of the safe harbor for repos in
2005 may have contributed to a sharp increase in repo financing shortly before the
2008 crisis. 19 That a safe harbor increases the incentive to use one form of credit
over another need not, on its own, be problematic. Basic Modigliani-Miller
principles predict that a debtor that chooses to save money on cheaper financing
with derivatives and repos would simply pay more for traditional debt financing,
because investors in bonds and loans who lose priority will simply charge higher
interest rates in compensation for the associated increase in expected default losses.
Absent frictions, there is nothing problematic about this. Even with frictions, a firm
rationally chooses its all-in lowest-cost form of financing. If extensive use of QFCs
raises the firm’s expected net frictional distress costs for itself and its creditors, in
total, the firm would reduce its use of QFCs. (The costs to its counterparties and
creditors is priced into the terms of its contracts, and thus born by the debtor as
well.) On the other hand, as with monitoring incentives, the firm does not consider
the systemic costs of its financing policy. So, does the safe harbor cause a
substitution away from other forms of financing that would have lower systemic
risk costs? We now turn to a consideration of this question.
Repos typically have shorter terms than traditional secured loans. The
majority of repo financing is overnight. As a result, repo financing is relatively

18 Some creditors, such as bank depositors, may be less likely to adjust their monitoring in response
to the QFC priority. But these creditors do not predominate with the large financial institutions
under consideration here.
19
These changes extended the safe harbor to repos using non-cash collateral such as mortgage-backed
securities. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J.
123, 138 (2010).
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fragile. If repo lenders lose confidence in the debtor and refuse to roll over a
debtor’s repos, the debtor can lose access to this financing almost instantly, as
occurred with the failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman. 20 With an automatic stay for
repos, cash lenders might be less interested in offering so much short-term credit in
the form of repos. Absent the safe harbor, some lenders such as money market
funds that are subject to rules requiring ready access to their funds might also face
regulatory obstacles to the use of repos. Would the next best alternative form of
financing be less subject to a run? It does seem likely that an automatic stay on
repos would lower the attractiveness of short-term repos that are backed by
relatively illiquid assets, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). As argued
by Gorton and Metrick (2011), cash lenders may have viewed CDO-backed repos as
a close substitute for cash deposits. 21 The safe harbor for QFCs enhances the ability
of cash investors in these repos to quickly extract themselves at low expected cost
from their credit exposures to weakening borrowers. Absent the safe harbor, a
significant amount of pre-crisis repo borrowing backed by CDOs might not have
occurred. This would likely have lowered some of the damaging systemic impact of
the financial crisis. Going forward, absent the safe harbor, some of the borrowing by
banks that is backed by relatively illiquid assets such as mortgages might have
longer maturities, and perhaps occur in the form of covered bonds rather than repos.
This could further lower the fragility of bank financing.
Fourth, in addition to promoting the financial fragility of systemically
important borrowers, the safe harbor for repos increases the potential for large and
destabilizing collateral fire sales. With no stay, repo cash lenders often have an
incentive, and in some cases a regulatory requirement, 22 to sell the collateralizing
securities they hold against repos as soon as possible after the failure of the debtor.
The safe harbor, which provides an incentive for the use of short-term repo-based
financing, might therefore lead to less stable markets. 23 The less liquid are the
collateralizing securities, the greater is the adverse impact of fire sales on the
underlying market.

Finally, the absence of a stay may diminish the willingness of the managers of
a troubled financial institution to voluntarily file for bankruptcy. If the managers
cannot stop counterparties from terminating their contracts and selling collateral,
they are less likely to initiate insolvency proceedings, because bankruptcy does not
give them a mechanism for delaying termination. This makes it more likely that

20 See, for example, Darrell Duffie, How Big Banks Fail – and What to Do About It, Princeton
University Press, 2010.
21 See Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,” 2011 Working
Paper, Yale University, forthcoming in Journal of Financial Economics.
22 Under Rule 2a7, money market funds are not permitted to invest in many of the types of securities
that back the repos in which they invest cash. For a discussion of the associated systemic risk, see A.
Copeland, D. Duffie, A. Martin, and S. McLaughlin, "Policy Issues in the Design of Tri-Party Repo
Markets,” Working Paper, Stanford University and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, July, 2011.
23 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469
(2009)(discussing bankruptcy’s benefits and the effect of the safe harbors).
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regulators will be left to initiate insolvency proceedings. Regulator-initiated
insolvency could be more costly. Regulators have less information than the
managers about the most efficient time to initiate bankruptcy. Regulators may also
hesitate for bureaucratic or political reasons. Regulators may be more likely to rely
on bailouts, which induce moral hazard.

Although we have focused principally on the exemption of QFCs from the
stay, the associated safe harbor also shelters QFC counterparties from bankruptcy
rules against “preferences.” Under the ordinary preference provision, creditors are
required to disgorge any payments or other transfers they receive during the ninety
days before a debtor files for bankruptcy. 24 (The preference provision is subject to a
variety of exclusions, one of which is noted below; the others are not relevant for
present purposes). The counterparties to a debtor’s QFCs are exempt from the
preference provision; they can retain any payments or collateral they have received
on the eve of bankruptcy. 25 The preference provision that applies to other creditors
has traditionally been justified as 1) promoting the equal treatment of similarly
situated creditors; and 2) as discouraging creditors from grabbing essential assets
when a debtor is in financial difficulty. With QFCs, this exemption from the
preferences provision has a potential chilling effect on the filing incentives of
managers that looms as large as concerns about equal treatment or the antigrabbing concerns of preference law. If the normal preference provision applied,
the debtor could retrieve any unusual payments or new collateral that it gave to a
counterparty on the eve of bankruptcy, which would provide further incentive to file
in some instances. (We say “unusual” because payments in the “ordinary course” are
generally protected. 26) If counterparties are exempt from the automatic stay, by
contrast, the debtor does not have this option.
The collapse of AIG in 2008 vividly illustrates the implications. After AIG was
downgraded, its previously uncollateralized derivatives counterparties began
demanding that it post collateral. Goldman Sachs, for instance, made aggressive
demands for collateral, leading to valuation disputes between it and AIG. These
massive collateral transfers on the eve of AIG’s collapse are classic examples of the
kind of preferential transfer that could, absent the safe harbor for QFCs, be retrieved
if the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Absent the exemption for QFCs, the ability to
retrieve this collateral would have given AIG’s managers a strong incentive to file for
bankruptcy as its fortunes deteriorated. Because Goldman and other counterparties
were exempt from the normal preference rules, making recovery of the collateral
considerably less likely, AIG’s managers had much less incentive to use bankruptcy.

Although the costs of the safe harbors for repos and derivatives are
considerable, they also bring some sizeable benefits. The first is a reduction of the
incentives of repo and derivatives counterparties to “run” as soon as the debtor’s
24
25
26

11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
11 U.S.C. § 546(e)&(f).
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).
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financial condition is suspect, accelerating a default or even causing a self-fulfilling
expectation of default that need not otherwise occur. Even with the safe-harbor
protection afforded by current law, QFC counterparties have demonstrated a
tendency to run from a weakening debtor. This was the case with the failures of
Bear Stearns and Lehman. 27 Absent the stay exemption, counterparties would have
an added incentive to pull out at the first sign of trouble, lest their contracts with the
debtor be tied up in a bankruptcy or other failure resolution process. By giving
counterparties greater flexibility to exit even after the debtor files for bankruptcy, a
safe harbor for QFCs is likely to reduce the counterparties’ incentives to run on the
eve of bankruptcy. It is important to recognize that runs are not always undesirable.
If a firm is insolvent and destined to fail, early intervention is likely to be preferable
to delay, particularly if it reduces insolvency costs. In this context, a “run” can be
seen as beneficial monitoring. But if the debtor is solvent, or if sudden exit will
produce destructive systemic consequences, runs are undesirable. The exemption
from the stay (and preference law) may make these undesirable runs less likely.

A second benefit of the safe harbor is that it increases the ability of a firm to
rely on critical hedges. Dealer banks and certain other large financial institutions
make effective use of high-volume and complex dynamic hedging strategies
involving derivatives and repos. The imposition of an automatic stay, in the event
that a financial institution’s counterparty undergoes some form of failure resolution,
could significantly impair the risk management of the financial institution, or even
destabilize the financial institution. Under a stay, derivatives and repos with the
debtor would be in limbo until the debtor decides which contracts to assume and
which to reject. This form of destabilization entails financial distress costs for the
firm itself and additional costs to the economy at large if the firm is systemically
important.

To consider this effect, suppose that a firm has a hedging transaction with a
failing debtor. A stay might place the hedge in a precarious condition. Most
obviously, a stay would allow the debtor to reject a hedging QFC whose gains have
already offset losses for the counterparty. The very purpose of a hedge is to lower
distress costs. A rejected QFC could therefore cause the counterparty to immediately
experience distress costs. Further, the failed debtor’s counterparty might be
reluctant or unable to obtain a replacement hedge before it knows whether the
debtor intends to assume the existing hedge. If a new “replacement” hedge is put in
place and if it eventually turns out that the original hedge is assumed by the debtor,
the combined effect of double hedging is about as risky as having no hedge at all.
Conversely, if a new hedge is not taken, the counterparty might find itself unhedged

See Anton Valukas, “Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner’s Report,”
Volume 4, 2010, D. Duffie, op. cit., as well as Copeland, Duffie, Martin, and McLaughlin (2011), op. cit.
We note that derivatives contracts with a weakening counterparty can often be exited via novation to
a new counterparty. A market participant could refuse to become the new counterparty, given the
associated exposure to the failing original party.
27
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if the debtor decides to reject the contract. An exemption from the stay clarifies this
situation, thus reducing risk. This lowers the potential distress costs of
counterparties to the debtor, and for the same reason may lower systemic risk.
Conversely, as we have already argued, an unlimited automatic stay on QFCs would
likely lower the sheer volume of OTC derivatives and repos that are used in practice,
eliminating much of the benefit of the improved performance of QFCs at failure that
the safe harbor allows.

Because of the safe harbor, counterparties terminated roughly 700,000 of
Lehman’s derivatives when it filed for bankruptcy. As explained by Summe (2011),
these terminations were processed without significant systemic knock-on effects.
Similarly, Lehman’s safe-harbored repos terminated as they matured with only
moderate counterparty default losses. In the event that a debtor cannot perform at
maturity, the repo counterparty is protected by its safe-harbored ability to liquidate
its collateral.

Finally, safe harbors from stays reduce the risk of costly delivery gridlocks in
securities markets that could otherwise occur at the failure of one or more
systemically important financial institutions. Suppose, for example, that a failing
debtor could limit access by its repo counterparties to collateralizing securities. If
those securities are “trapped” in a stay, they cannot be used for the planned
purposes of the repo counterparties. These planned uses include commitments to
settle new securities transactions and to return securities to the counterparties of
other repo agreements. It is not unusual, for example, for the outstanding quantity
of commitments to deliver a particular on-the-run issue of treasury notes to be
several times the total outstanding issue size, because of the chains of repos and
other forms of pledges that are often made of the same securities.

A similar argument applies to securities lending agreements. In the absence
of a stay, securities deliveries that are facilitated by repos and securities lending
agreements can continue unimpeded by the failure of the debtor. On the other hand,
it can be argued, common knowledge of the existence of a potential stay on repos
and securities lending agreements would change market practice in a way that
reduces the quantity of such “fragile daisy chains” of delivery commitments, thus
lowering concerns about significant delivery gridlocks. While this argument has
merit, the ability to use QFCs to freely pledge and re-pledge securities generally
promotes market efficiency. Indeed, central banks rely heavily on repos to promote
market liquidity and to implement monetary policy. Further, as evidence of the
systemic importance of the reliability of repo settlements, the U.S. securities
industry has recently introduced a penalty for any failure to deliver Treasuries
under a repo agreement, in order to lower the potential for costly settlement
gridlocks and systemic risk. 28 This failure penalty is slated to be extended to other
heavily traded fixed-income securities.
28

See Treasuries Markets Practices Group, “Frequently Asked Questions: TMPG Fails Charge,”
September 23, 2011, where the TMPG writes: “Why does the TMPG recommend a financial charge on
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Tightness in the easily-found supply of a given type of security reduces the
likelihood that speculators and hedgers will be able to quickly and efficiently locate
these securities for useful investment purposes. 29 The more liquid and active the
type of security, the greater is the social benefit of reliance on the unimpeded return
of repo collateral. US treasuries are at the top of the list because of the size, efficient
infrastructure, and “safe-haven” status of the cash and repo markets for treasuries.
Thus, a discussion of the cost-benefit tradeoff of automatic stays in repos could lead
to safe-harbor policies that make a distinction among repos and securities lending
agreements that is based on the importance of liquidity in the market for the
underlying securities.
Safe Harbors for Market Utilities
We turn now to a consideration of the special costs and benefits of stays on
central market utilities for QFCs, such as repo clearing banks and OTC derivatives
central clearing counterparties (CCPs).

By “clearing” a derivatives contract, a CCP, also known as a “clearinghouse,”
becomes the counterparty to each of the two original participants to the contract.
That is, the CCP becomes the seller to each buyer, and the buyer to each seller. The
main purpose of clearing is to insulate the original counterparties from
counterparty default risk. The Dodd-Frank Act requires, with some exceptions, the
central clearing of “standard” derivatives. 30 Roughly speaking, a “standard”
derivative is one that is sufficiently liquidly traded to be safely and efficiently
cleared. Once the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) interpret and implement this clearing
requirement, some CCPs are expected to be extremely large holders of OTC
derivatives, and to have large bilateral positions with essentially all major market
participants. As a result, the question of whether and how stays should apply to a
clearinghouse is now a crucial part of the equation.
Analogously, a single tri-party repo clearing bank such as JP Morgan Chase
and Bank of New York Mellon can have an intra-day book of repo positions

settlement fails? Persistent elevated fail levels create market inefficiencies, increase credit risk for
market participants and heighten overall systemic risk. In higher rate environments, the time value
of money that is lost when delivery is not made as contracted provides an incentive to sellers to
deliver bonds as agreed. Given that this incentive is smaller in low short-term rate environments,
sellers are less sensitive to the timeliness of delivery. The TMPG recommends a financial charge to
provide an incentive to sellers to deliver securities in a timely fashion and to therefore reduce overall
fail levels.”
29 See D. Duffie, N. Garleanu, and L. H. Pedersen, "Securities Lending, Shorting, and Pricing,'' Journal of
Financial Economics 2002, Volume 66: 307-339.
30 Under Dodd-Frank Act § 723, the CFTC and SEC are instructed to review swaps and to determine
which must be cleared. Exemptions will apply to certain market participants and types of trades.
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representing a large fraction of the entire stock of important classes of fixed-income
securities. Although ongoing reform of the tri-party repo market is likely to
significantly lower the participation of clearing banks as direct repo counterparties,
there remain other central repo market utilities, such as the Fixed Income Clearing
Corporation, Euroclear, and Clearstream. The central clearing of repos could also
emerge in a significant way.

A standard bankruptcy stay on the QFCs of these sorts of central market
utilities could trigger significant damage to the financial system. The situation
could be compared to what might have easily happened following the notorious
events at the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. As reported
by Ingber (2011), 31 central market utilities for repos, including the Government
Securities Clearing Corporation and the two main clearing banks, JP Morgan Chase
and Bank of New York Mellon, were significantly incapacitated. Only extreme and
highly discretionary human efforts averted a catastrophic market gridlock in the
delivery of needed securities. Absent these efforts, many firms participating in these
markets might have collapsed. In the end, there were approximately 2,000 failures
to deliver promised securities, valued at about $96 billion.
Although a resolution authority could arrange for a failing debtor’s repos or
OTC derivatives to be “bridged to safety,” and the contracts could be assumed in a
bankruptcy, any uncertainty among market participants about the resolve and
ability to do so quickly and effectively could lead to extreme and unsettling market
behavior.
The applicability of the stay to central market utilities is relevant in two
different contexts: in the event that one or more of the large counterparties to the
central market utility default, and in the event that the central utility itself defaults.

We first consider the case of default by a member of a derivatives
clearinghouse. If such a debtor is put into resolution under Title II of Dodd-Frank,
the clearinghouse is protected from the effects of resolution in several important
respects. The receiver is explicitly required to continue to honor the debtor’s
margin and other obligations to the extent possible, for instance, and the CCP can
terminate the QFC or exercise its other contractual rights if the receiver fails to do
so. 32 The clearinghouse does, however, face one major restriction: The CCP, like
other counterparties, is subject to the provision that delays the exercise of
termination rights until 5 p.m. on the day after the resolution is initiated. 33 The
clearinghouse could insist on adequate margin during this period, but could not
terminate unless the receiver fails to provide it. If the failing member’s derivatives

See J. Ingber, Resurrecting the Street: How U.S. Markets Prevailed After 9/11, self-published, 2011.
Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(8)(G). In addition, if the receiver transfers a cleared derivative, the
clearinghouse is not required to accept the transferee as a member of the clearinghouse. Dodd-Frank
Act § 210(c)(9)(C).
33 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(C)(10)(B).
31
32
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are bridged by the FDIC, they remain “alive” and unterminated, provided the CCP
accepts the assignment to the bridge. 34

Merely a short delay in the effective treatment of a failed clearing member’s
positions could be important in a setting of heightened market uncertainty. Even
unfounded suspicions that a large CCP could be destabilized by its inability to
quickly and efficiently terminate or transfer the derivatives of a large failing
member could lead to extreme systemic risk. Under current CPSS-IOSCO standards,
the default management plan of a CCP is to be designed so as to safely handle the
failure of its single largest clearing member. 35 Under this single-failure standard,
there is little tolerance for unanticipated losses to other clearing members.

In order to mitigate some of the risks of a delay that might be induced by a
stay, the CCP could, before the expiration of the stay, begin to plan for the
termination or redistribution of the derivatives contracts that it holds with its failed
member. 36 For example, the default management plan of ICE Trust, currently the
largest CCP for credit default swaps, is based on an auction in which surviving
members make bids and offers for the failed member’s contracts. The auction could
be conducted after one day has passed, if the FDIC has done nothing by then. The
CCP could potentially call off the auction if the FDIC has assigned the derivatives to a
bridge institution. Presuming no legal impediment, the CCP could even hold such an
auction during the stay period, but with the stipulation that the executions of the
auction trades are contingent on the expiration of the stay without an assignment
action by the FDIC. Because the FDIC “stay” is a restriction on termination rather
than a true stay, a contingent auction seems unlikely to violate the Dodd-Frank
resolution rules. Conveniently, the FDIC is required to treat each failing member’s
derivatives positions with the CCP in an all-or-none fashion.
Clearinghouses are subject to the same rules as other parties with respect to
QFCs in bankruptcy. Because of the safe harbors from the stay and from
bankruptcy’s anti-ipso-facto provisions, the clearinghouse could immediately
terminate the derivatives (as long as it does so relatively promptly) 37 and hold or
sell any collateral of a clearing member who has filed for bankruptcy. For example,
the CME clearinghouse liquidated its exchange-traded derivatives positions with

The Dodd-Frank Act, §210(c) (9) (C), gives the CCP the right not to accept the assignment.
See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Technical Committee of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions, “Recommendations for
Central Counterparties,” Consultative Report, March 2004, Bank for International Settlements.
36 Some CCPs manage the failure of a clearing member through termination settlement of the
positions of the failing member, rather than redistribution of the “live” positions to surviving
members. Termination, however, implies that non-defaulting members who suffer unexpected and
involuntary termination of their positions may suddenly be left without needed hedges. This could be
destabilizing.
37 In the Lehman case, the bankruptcy judge held that counterparties who delayed termination until
months after bankruptcy was filed had waived their right to invoke the safe harbor from the
automatic stay. [cite Metavante].
34
35
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Lehman rapidly, although not entirely without controversy. 38 The clearinghouse
could not, however, unilaterally insist on margin adjustments. The exemptions from
the stay and related provisions cover only the “exercise of any contractual right … to
cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration” of QFC agreements, “or to offset
or net out any termination values or payment amounts.” 39 The clearinghouse would
therefore need to seek court approval of any requests for new margin. The
clearinghouse also would be stayed from any efforts to collect any uncollateralized
obligations that remained after netting and disposition of its collateral.
The second possibility is that a clearinghouse itself, rather than one of its
members, becomes financially distressed. Here, although the formal rules are
similar, different factors may come into play. The definition of “financial company”
in the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly includes clearing agencies, 40 which means that a
clearinghouse can be put in Title II resolution if regulators make the appropriate
determinations. As with the resolution of other financial companies, margin and
other obligations presumably would continue to apply. Counterparties would be
subject to the one-plus day delay in exercising their termination rights. 41 If a
clearinghouse files for bankruptcy, on the other hand, counterparties of the
clearinghouse would be permitted to terminate their contracts and take other steps
to collect what they are owed by the CCP, as discussed earlier. Counterparties
would, however, be required to seek court approval before taking any other actions,
such as efforts to collect any uncollateralized obligations that remain after
terminating a contract.

Although the formal rules are similar, the failure of a clearinghouse could
pose particularly difficult issues for the resolution process. The danger of a run on
a troubled clearinghouse exists because the first counterparties to terminate their
contracts would likely be paid in full, whereas those that delay might be appreciably
more exposed. 42

The danger of a run on a CCP might be exacerbated by “interoperability”
among CCPs, by which market participants have the option to clear a given
derivatives contract in any of a set of related CCPs. Interoperability allows two
market participants to enter a trade with each other and then clear the trade with
two different CCPs. The two interoperating CCPs would in this case have a master
clearing agreement that allows them to share collateral posted by their respective
clearing members. 43 Given the requirement to clear, the absence of interoperating

See the Lehman Examiners’ Report, by Anton Valukas, Volume IV.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 560 (swaps).
40 Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(4)(B)(defining U.S. financial company to include clearing agencies).
Clearing agencies singled out by the Federal Reserve as systemically important would qualify as Fedsupervised financial companies under Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(4)(D).
41 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(C)(10)(B).
42 This is one of the points made in Julia Lees Allen, Note, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic
Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
43 See J. Maegerle and T. Nellen. 2011. “Interoperability Between Central Counterparties.”
38
39
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CCPs to whom clearing members can quickly “port” their positions could thus limit
the potential for a run. Alternatively, with a stay, a run could be stopped once the
failure resolution process or bankruptcy is initiated. Currently, there are no
interoperability agreements among CCPs for over-the-counter derivatives.

Currently, and probably for at least a few more years, JPMorgan, Bank of
America, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, and Morgan Stanley hold a greater volume of
derivatives, and far more complex derivatives, than most or all CCPs. The challenge
faced by the FDIC in resolving the derivatives of a major dealer is thus currently
greater than that for any CCP. This is also so because the legal and financial
complexity of safely disentangling the QFCs from a failing financial firm would be
much greater for a large global dealer bank than for a dedicated central market
utility such as a CCP. The concept behind the “living wills” provision of Dodd Frank
may help eventually, but the actual ability to safely handle the QFCs of a large dealer
bank under a failure-resolution plan currently lags the concept, as emphasized by
Summe (2011). The number of entities who have OTC derivatives with a large
dealer bank is enormous in comparison with a CCP.
Repos: Our Joint Policy Conclusion
Although the two of us tend to give somewhat different weights to the costs
and benefits that we have described, we agree that these are the most important
factors in assessing the usefulness of safe harbors. We also agree on one major
piece of the puzzle: the basic treatment of repos. In our view, this treatment turns
on the distinction between repos that are collateralized by highly liquid securities,
on the one hand, and repos that are collateralized by less liquid kinds of assets.

The value of a failing debtor’s estate is not significantly enhanced by the
ability to stay a repo counterparty’s access to liquid collateralizing securities, such
as treasuries. Stays are designed to enhance the value of a debtor’s estate through
continued access to the sorts of assets or services that either are critical to ongoing
business operations or to lowering frictional liquidation costs. Access to
marketable securities might give the debtor a source of liquidity, which is of course
essential for a financial institution, but this is the purpose of debtor-in-possession
(DIP) financing. Indeed, if the failed debtor needs certain liquid securities, they can
by definition be purchased quickly and at low frictional costs using DIP financing.
Although DIP financing is not a perfect substitute for continued access to the
securities, since it must be bargained for and then approved by a court, a repo
counterparty could not be forced to continue to lend to the debtor, even without a
safe harbor. Under current bankruptcy law, lending contracts are automatically
terminated when the debtor files for bankruptcy, and a promise to make a loan
(defined as a “financial accommodation”) cannot be enforced by the debtor. 44 A
Working paper, Swiss National Bank.
44 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2).
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court would therefore be likely to lift the stay and to permit a secured party that is
secured by liquid assets to sell the assets, or at the least to require that the secured
party be fully protected. 45 Because liquid marketable securities are by definition
easily converted to cash, and vice versa, there is no reason to delay a counterparty’s
access to them.

In summary, the more liquid is the market for a class of securities, the greater
is the expected efficiency gain of that market’s continued reliance for liquidity on
repo and securities lending safe harbors, and the lower is the likely benefit to failing
debtors of a potential stay on QFCs backed by that class of securities. Because of this,
Skeel & Jackson (2011) conclude that repos of liquid securities should be deemed to
be breached upon the bankruptcy of a debtor, giving counterparties immediate
access to the pledged securities. This is effectively the treatment afforded by a QFC
safe harbor. We both agree with this conclusion, which is also reflected in the
proposed “Chapter 14” special bankruptcy provisions of Jackson (2011).

A similar analysis would apply to the application of ordinary preference law
to repos. In theory, payments or adjustments to a repo during the ninety days
before bankruptcy would be subject to attack by the debtor or a trustee in
bankruptcy as preferences. In practice, the danger to a repo counterparty of being
forced to disgorge prebankruptcy payments or adjustments is limited. So long as
the repo securities are worth more than the price at which the debtor is obligated to
buy them back, any transfers by the debtor to a repo buyer would be protected.
Payments to a fully secured creditor are not treated as preferential. This is based on
the theory that the creditor would be paid in full even if no payments were made
prior to bankruptcy, and thus is not being “preferred.” 46 Repo buyers are essentially
fully secured creditors. In other work, Skeel and Jackson (2011) have advocated
that bankruptcy’s “two point net improvement” rule be applied to repos and
derivatives, in order to remove any lingering uncertainty. Under this rule, which is
currently used for loans collateralized by inventory or accounts receivable, the
counterparty would be protected so long as it was no more fully protected as of
bankruptcy than it was 90 days before bankruptcy (or at the time the loan was made,
if it was made less than 90 days before bankruptcy). 47 The same principle could be
extended to repos. In our view, it makes sense to provide this protection to all repos,
even those that involve relatively illiquid collateral.

To some extent, the safe-harbor treatment (for most purposes) of repos
collateralized by liquid marketable securities, as opposed to less liquid assets, is
reflected in the current bankruptcy code, which does not treat certain “less liquid”
forms of repos as qualifying for the safe harbor. Under the original definition, as

45 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)(providing relief from the stay “for cause,” including a lack of adequate
protection).
46 The secured creditor therefore does not receive “more than” it would have received absent the
transfer, which means that 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) is not met.
47 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5).
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adopted in 1984, only repos collateralized by treasury bills and other cash-like
securities were protected by the safe harbor. In 2005, the safe harbor for
repurchase agreements under Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code was expanded to
include repos involving “mortgage related securities” as well as “mortgage loans”
and “interests in mortgage related securities or mortgage loans.” 48 The mortgagerelated securities that were added to the definition in 2005 are often comparatively
illiquid, as the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis has made clear. The safe harbor
further extends, under Section 741 of the Bankruptcy Code, to a range of
transactions known as “securities contracts” that effectively cover most of the
remaining forms of “repos” currently conducted by dealer banks. We believe that
this historical expansion of the repo safe harbor to include repos collateralized by
less liquid securities was probably excessive, at least from the viewpoint of social
costs.
Darrell’s Policy View for OTC Derivatives Stays
I believe that the safe harbor should be eliminated for all uncleared
derivatives. The transition to the loss of safe harbor for uncleared derivatives
should be delayed for several years from its announcement in order to allow time
for market participants to adjust their balance sheets and risk-management
methodologies to an environment that includes stays on these contracts. There
should be a comprehensive safe-harbor for those derivatives that have been cleared
by a failed market participant (other than a CCP) under a regulatory standard for
clearing, such as Dodd-Frank in the U.S.
This separate treatment of cleared and uncleared derivatives strikes a
balance between costs and benefits, one that reaps the net benefits of reliance on a
safe harbor where they matter the most, which is for large liquid classes of
derivatives. This is basically the policy suggested by Tuckman, 49 who believes
however that a CCP is not an appropriate approach to clearing. This separated
approach to stay exemptions is only effective if a significant fraction of derivatives
are cleared, and if the most liquid derivatives are those that are cleared. I think
those conditions are likely to apply after some time has passed. This policy has the
likely side effect of encouraging the use of clearing. While increased use of clearing
is likely to lower systemic risk, it is too early to be completely confident of that.

For the case of a failed CCP, as opposed to a failed clearing member, the costbenefit tradeoff for stay exemptions is more complex, and depends in part on the
potential for a run on a CCP. It is reasonable to suppose that the class of cleared

11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(defining “repurchase agreement”).
See Tuckman, Bruce “Amending Safe Harbors to Reduce Systemic Risk in OTC Derivatives Markets,
“ Center for Financial Stability, Working Paper, April 22, 2010.
48
49
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derivatives largely coincides with the class of derivatives that is legally required to
be cleared. If so, it would usually be illegal to run from a CCP to a counterparty that
is not a CCP. There could, however, be a rush to enter offsetting trades with a CCP
before its failure. This would not likely destabilize a CCP that handles margins
prudently, although it may lead to some disruption of related markets. After its
failure, a CCP would presumably have the right to suspend the clearing of new
trades, so a run via offsetting new trades can be stopped without a stay. Overall,
then, the damage caused by a run on a CCP seems limited except perhaps in a
situation involving interoperability, as we have explained. In the absence of a stay, I
would propose a regulatory prohibition of the use of interoperability to novate
derivatives from one CCP to another after the failure of one of the two CCPs, except
as expressly permitted by the primary regulator of the failed CCP.

Aside from the effect of a run, one should consider the contagious effect of
the failure of a CCP on its clearing members, and how that impact might be
mitigated by a stay. By the very fact of its failure, a CCP is unable meet its obligations
to its clearing members in a timely fashion, whether or not there is a stay. How
could a stay reduce the associated damage? Under the stay that would be
accompanied by a Title-II resolution of the CCP, the FDIC could use its discretion to
separate clearing members into three groups: (1) those whose derivatives should be
transferred (without recourse by the transferee) to a reliable “bridge CCP,” (2) those
whose derivatives should be allowed to terminate or be assigned to another clearing
member under the normal contractual default-management process of the CCP, and
(3) those whose derivatives should be rejected. If this discretion is used effectively
by the FDIC, the stay could be a powerful mitigant of systemic damage caused by the
failure of a CCP, including the total distress costs to clearing members. The main
disadvantages would be any inefficient use of this power, and the effect of
uncertainty among clearing members regarding how the discretion of the FDIC
would be applied.
Under the new “Chapter 14” of the bankruptcy law that has been proposed
by Jackson (2011), whether or not under a stay, a CCP that has filed for bankruptcy
would provide some cash liquidity to clearing members against derivatives claims
that are systemically important. This provision of liquidity would be subject to
clawbacks described by Jackson, and could be funded through debtor-in-possession
financing. During the stay proposed by Jackson, the debtor could also decide which
clearing members would have their derivatives terminated or re-assigned as
stipulated under the original derivatives contracts, and which clearing members
would have their derivatives rejected.

Absent a stay of derivatives with a failed CCP, the attempt to contractually
terminate or re-assign the derivatives of the CCP, nearly all of them simultaneously,
would likely lead to indiscriminant and potentially uncontrollable damage to many
clearing members. Confusion and uncertainty could be heightened, among clearing
members and more broadly. The contagion induced by such an unwind is
unpredictable.
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The situation faced by a failed CCP can be compared to the failure of a major
dealer bank, several of which currently have vastly more derivatives than any CCP,
including more complex derivatives, and with more counterparties. With Lehman’s
bankruptcy, the systemic damage caused by the unstayed treatment of its OTC
derivatives was manageable without heavy systemic damage, as explained by
Summe (2011), but this could in part be due to the other resources available to
Lehman’s estate. Given the absence of a stay, for example, Lehman’s unsecured bond
creditors offered a substantial loss-absorbing buffer to the derivatives claimants
that would not be present for a failed CCP whose “waterfall” of margins, defaultguarantee funds, and capital have, by the definition of failure, been fully
exhausted. 50 That is, there is likely to be no liquid resources available to a CCP once
it has failed. The liquidity support of the Federal Reserve provided under Title VIII
of Dodd-Frank is designed to offer cash loans collateralized by the non-cash
resources of the CCP. It might be only after cash liquidity supplied by the Fed has
been exhausted that the CCP would fail (if it fails at all) and any stay could begin.
A decision by a government to “bail out” a CCP, providing it with new capital
(as opposed to liquidity backed by the assets of the CCP), could mitigate systemic
damage either before or after the failure of a CCP. Such a bailout, however, could not
be relied upon, especially in the prevailing political environment. In any case,
reliance on this form of support raises moral hazard. It is doubtful that the costbenefit analysis of stays for failed CCPs should place much weight, for policy
purposes, on government bailouts.
Overall, I believe that it is prudent, pending further analysis, to allow a brief
stay of the derivatives held by a failed CCP. The duration of the stay should be only
long enough to allow the effective exercise of the powers allowed under the stay,
assuming the existence of an efficient infrastructure for this purpose. For example,
the stay durations of Dodd-Frank’s Title-II, one day, and of Jackson’s Chapter 14,
three days, seem reasonable. These stays would be too brief to make effective use of
the stays absent effective information technology designed for the purpose of
quickly exercising the powers allowed by the stay.
David’s Policy View
Although I prefer a short, across-the-board stay on derivatives in bankruptcy,
as I will detail below, I quite like your proposal for a stay on uncleared derivatives.
Such a stay would reach the derivatives that most need to be stayed; and as you note,
the differential treatment of cleared and uncleared derivatives would create at least
a small additional incentive to use cleared derivatives. I also agree that the change
in bankruptcy treatment should be phased in over time, to minimize the disruption
of shifting to the new regime. Overall, I would be a much happier person if you were

50

The default-management process of a CCP is outlined in the appendix of D. Duffie (2010), op. cit.
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appointed as derivatives czar, and given the authority to determine the rules for
regulation of derivatives in bankruptcy and elsewhere.

I nevertheless believe that a short stay should be applied to all derivatives,
cleared as well as uncleared. To be sure, several of the principal dangers of
unstayed derivatives are most pronounced with derivatives that are not cleared.
The risk of firesales may be greater, for instance, since uncleared derivatives are
more likely to be collateralized by illiquid collateral. But the underlyings of cleared
derivatives may also be illiquid, and even seemingly liquid collateral can also pose a
risk of firesales in the midst of a financial crisis. Similarly, a stay on derivatives may
only give managers an incentive to file for bankruptcy rather than waiting for
regulators to intervene if it (and ordinary preference rules) applies to cleared
derivatives, since most dealers’ derivatives portfolios will include large amounts of
cleared derivatives.

Oddly enough, if Dodd-Frank achieves its objective of moving a large majority
of derivatives to CCPs, imposing a stay on cleared derivatives may be more rather
than less important. The likelihood that a substantial portion of a dealer’s cleared
derivatives will involve illiquid and difficult-to-value collateral will be much higher
if there is a massive shift to clearing, for instance, and managers would have little
incentive to prepare for bankruptcy if most of their derivatives portfolio consisted
of cleared and therefore unstayed derivatives. To minimize disruption, I believe the
stay should be short— Jackson and I have advocated a three-day stay elsewhere—
but that it should apply to all derivatives. For similar reasons, I also believe that it
should apply to the clearing bank in tri-party repo arrangements.

If the stay did indeed include cleared derivatives, lawmakers would need to
decide whether it should apply to the CCP as well as the debtor’s counterparties, or
just to the counterparties. There is a plausible argument for exempting the CCP
from the stay. A three-day stay would complicate a CCP’s margin calculations, since
it would need to require adequate margin not just for current values of the
derivative, but also for potential changes in value up to three days into the future.
But a CCP’s margin calculations, under best practice, already are supposed to be
enough to cover not only the normal re-margining period, but also the period
necessary to unwind the position in a default scenario, which would take a few
days. 51 Thus, a three-day stay would not significantly alter the CCP’s time horizon. ,
Similarly, CCPs would not be able to terminate and replace derivatives instantly,
even in the absence of a stay. It would take the CCP a day or two to set up an auction
to replace a debtor’s derivatives positions. So long as the stay did not prevent the
CCP from making preparations for the auctions, conditioned on the debtor’s
nonassumption of the derivatives (and I would advocate that the stay be defined to
explicitly permit these kinds of preparations), I believe the effect of a stay on the
CCP would therefore be limited enough to be manageable.
51

See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Technical Committee of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (2004) op. cit.
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The failure of the CCP itself, rather than a dealer, would pose somewhat
different issues. Some of the main objectives of resolving the financial failure of
dealers and other firms do not apply in the same way to a CCP. With other firms, the
desire to preserve the going concern value of the business if it remains viable is an
important consideration. This factor seems less central with a CCP. Limiting the
potentially destructive effects of the inability to make good on large numbers of
derivatives is a much more pressing consideration. In addition, it is not clear that
the presence or absence of a stay would affect the CCP’s managers’ incentives to file
for bankruptcy to nearly the same extent as with managers of a dealer or other firm.

The importance of a stay may depend on how many CCPs emerge, and
whether the failing CCP has a large presence in the market. If a small CCP failed, the
stay may not be essential. If a CCP of any size fails, by contrast, I think a stay would
be essential, for the reasons you very persuasively detail. Neither the FDIC nor a
private decision maker could effectively handle large numbers of derivatives quickly
enough to prevent systemic damage in the absence of the stay. It seems likely that
the market for CCPs will be sufficiently concentrated as to warrant general
application of a short stay to all CCPs, as you recommend.
Overall, I differ from you only in my conclusion that the stay should apply to
both cleared and uncleared derivatives. I agree that the duration of the stay should
be limited, and that it should be phased in over time. In my view, the imposition of a
limited stay in bankruptcy would go far toward plugging a major gap in the DoddFrank reforms.
Concluding Remarks
After an extensive dialogue, and in part because of some convergence caused by that
dialogue, the respective policy views that we have described are somewhat similar.
To summarize, we both believe that repos (and related QFCs such as securities
lending agreements) that are backed by liquid securities should be exempted from
automatic stays, or receive an effectively similar treatment. Repos backed by illiquid
assets, on the other hand, should not be given this safe harbor. We both believe that
uncleared derivatives should be subject to automatic stays. One of us (David)
believes that stays should also apply to cleared derivatives. The other (Darrell)
favors an exemption of cleared derivatives from stays, except in the case of a failure
of a regulated central clearing party. Both of us believe that the period of any stay on
cleared OTC derivatives should be only long enough for an efficient exercise of the
debtor’s rights under a stay, a few days at most.
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